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In an experiment using two consecutive trust games, we study how  “cheap” signals such as 
promises and messages are used to restore damaged trust and encourage new trust where it did 
not  previously  exist.  In  these  games,  trustees  made  non-binding  promises  of  investment-
contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how 
much to return. After an unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, 
trustees could send a one-way message. This naturalistic quasi-experimental design allowed us to 
observe the endogenous emergence of trust-relevant behaviors and focus on naturally occurring 
remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, 
and subsequent outcomes. In the  first game  16.6% of trustees were distrusted  and 18.8% of 
trusted trustees broke promises. Trustees distrusted in the first game used promises closer to 
equal splits and messaging to encourage trust in the second game.  To restore damaged trust, 
promise-breakers  used  larger  new  promises  (signals  of  intended  atonement)  and  messaging 
(usually with apology). On average, investments in each game paid off for investors and trustees, 
suggesting that cheap signals foster profitable trust-based exchanges in these economic games.  
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In modern economies where trust realizes vast amounts of potential gains in transactions 
involving deferred or risky returns, problems associated with developing and restoring trust are 
particularly relevant. A scientific understanding of the processes that  restore trust when  it is 
damaged  and  encourage  trust  where  it  did  not  previously  exist  is  therefore  of  paramount 
importance. Despite the large literature on damages to corporate reputation  (e.g., see Barnett 
2003  on  US  chemical  industry  disasters;  see  Robinson  &  Rousseau  1994  for  a  survey  of 
corporate trust violations), very little research exists on how damaged trust can be rebuilt and 
new trust encouraged where it did not previously exist (Dirks et al. 2009). Most of the existing 
research in this area is either purely theoretical (Lewicki & Bunker 1996; Mishra 1996; Lewicki 
& Wiethoff 2000; Ren & Gray 2009; Gillespie & Dietz 2009), based on anecdotal or event-based 
evidence (Elsbach 1994; Knight & Pretty 1999), surveys (Slovic 1993), diary studies (Conway & 
Briner 2002) fabricated vignettes (Tomlinson et al. 2004), fabricated videotaped dramatizations 
(Kim et al. 2004, 2006), or incentivized experimental designs using deception (Gibson et al. 
1999;  Bottom  et  al.  2002;  Nakyachi  &  Watabe  2005;  Schweitzer  et  al.  2006;  Ohtsubo  & 
Watanabe 2009). To study how damaged trust can be rebuilt and new trust can be encouraged, 
we conducted a non-deceptive economic experiment with endogenously created and naturally 
distributed signals, using financially motivated subjects.  
Our experiment is based on a version of the “investment game” by Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe (1995). In the original investment game an investor is endowed with $10 and can invest 
any portion of her endowment by sending it to a trustee. The amount sent triples in value before 
reaching  the  trustee.  Having  received  funds  from  this  tripled  investment,  the  trustee  can 
reciprocate by returning any portion of these funds to the investor. Since sending money is risky, 
investments are usually interpreted as trust, and since returning money is costly, reciprocation 
via returns on investments is interpreted as evidence of trustworthiness.
1 The investment game, 
therefore, has been extensively used to study trust and reciprocity in an investment setting (for a 
                                                 
1 This  interpretation  is  based  on  the  assumption  that  participants  identify  psychological  and  implied  contracts 
(Rousseau 1989) and in doing so act in accordance with social contracts, though there is no social contract about 
expected or contingent behavior stated in the standard implementation of the classic “investment game” (see Berg et 
al. 1995), which over the years has become better known as the “trust game”. In fact, because the assertion that the 
original game was about “trust” was debatable, John Dickhaut preferred calling it the “investment game” – as it is in 
the 1995 Berg et al. article. By adding a new starting stage to the game where trustees make promises to return a 
portion of income from investment – this game becomes a game more explicitly about trust. For this reason we refer 
to our modified form of the classic investment game, described below, as a “trust game”.  
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review see Ostrom & Walker 2005). A common finding in the literature is that investors tend to 
exhibit  trust  and trustees  tend to  reciprocate.  It has  also  been  well  established  that  pre-play 
communication, even if “irrelevant” to game strategy, can induce higher contributions in public 
goods games (for meta-analyses see Sally 1995, Balliet 2010) and more cooperation in dyadic 
social dilemmas (Deutsch 1958, 1960; Radlow & Weidner 1966; Buchan et al. 2002; Duffy & 
Feltovich 2006; Bracht & Feltovich 2009). However, with the exception of a few studies using 
deception,  the  experimental  economic  literature  is  silent  as  to  what  behavior  ensues  when 
promises  fail  to  establish  trust  and  what  happens  to  trust  and  reciprocity  in  subsequent 
interactions after promises are broken and trust is damaged. 
 
1.2. Background 
Non-binding  social  contracts  based  on  mutual  agreement  and  advantage  can  secure 
opportunities  to  gain  from  trade,  but  may  also  pose  risks  to  those  entering  into  them:  they 
provide cheaters opportunities for greater immediate gains while consequences to cheaters may 
be non-existent, uncertain, or delayed. Our research focuses on social contracts in trust-based 
investment exchanges that provide opportunity for mutual advantage. In these exchanges, we 
consider trust to be demonstrated when resources or control is willingly ceded to another with 
the  expectation  that  the  other  intends  to  reciprocate.  Trustworthiness  is  demonstrated  by 
reciprocating so as to, at minimum, restitute the loss of resources or control that another has 
ceded by extending trust. 
To  successfully  navigate  a  social  contract  and  avoid  exploitation  by  cheaters,  it  is 
important for potentially trusting investors to obtain accurate information about the ability and 
willingness  (propensity)  of  the  trustees  to  carry  out  their  end  of  the  contract.  Trusting  and 
trustworthy reputations that have been demonstrated by past actions serve as reliable cues upon 
which trust-based decisions can be made. Where reputational assurances are not available, such 
as  in  novel  relationships  with  unknown  partners,  credible  information  about  an  investor’s 
willingness to trust or a trustee’s trustworthiness is not as readily accessible. In the absence of 
reputational  cues,  signals
2 are  often  sent  to  receivers  with  the  intention  to  communicate 
                                                 
2 We distinguish cues from signals (borrowing from similar definitions by Diggle et al. 2007; Scott-Phillips 2008) as 
follows. Cue: Any act or structure that (i) affects the behavior of other organisms; (ii) which is effective because the 
effect has evolved to be affected by the act or structure; but which (iii) did not evolve. Signal: Any act or structure 
that (i) affects the behavior of other organisms; (ii) evolved because of those effects; and (iii) which is effective  
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information about the sender (e.g., see Farrel & Rabin 1996). For example, signals may be sent 
with the intention of persuading receivers that the sender  is  more trustworthy than  might be 
inferred from cues alone. 
Signals persuading investors of a trustee’s trustworthiness are fundamental to developing 
mutually  beneficial  relationships  under  conditions  where  trust  has  not  yet  been  established 
(where cues are not available) and where trust has been damaged but not yet restored (where 
cues indicate untrustworthiness). Without the effective use of signals, a cooperative interaction 
may be foregone: potential investors may decide not to extend trust when they lack reputational 
assurances and when cues indicate a breach of trust. This is true whether trust has been damaged 
intentionally, accidentally, or as a result of mistaken interpretations of intent (Axelrod & Dion 
1988).  
When interests conflict (e.g., in social dilemmas), there should be skepticism about the 
credibility of signals of trustworthiness. Individuals may use signals to convey that they have a 
trustworthy propensity, yet those signals may be deceptive. When such deception brings rewards, 
then signalers have incentive to produce lies. If lies are a common problem, then an explanation 
of why recipients of those signals would continue to respond to the signals poses a problem for 
the evolution of signals. Natural selection would not reward recipients of dishonest signals if 
receiving the signals is more costly than not. Those who do not receive the same signals used to 
deceive others would gain a relative advantage – out-competing the misfortunate receivers of 
deceptive signals (Dawkins & Krebs 1978; Maynard Smith 1982). Thus, the existence of signals 
that can deceive selects for skepticism among potential receivers. 
Zahavi (1975) partially addressed the fundamental question of “why are signals reliable?” 
when he suggested that some signals are reliable to the extent they are guaranteed by their costs. 
More specifically, the reliability of “costly” signals corresponds (positively) to the costs of their 
production,  especially  when  the  presence  of  individuals’  relevant  qualities  is  a  necessary 
condition for offsetting the “handicapping” costs of developing or sending these signals. Insofar 
as signal production costs outweigh the benefits gained from using those signals deceptively (but 
not  from  using  them  honestly), reception  of  signals  will  continue,  and  deceptive  senders  of 
signals will be out-competed by honest signalers who can afford to signal (Zahavi 1977, 1993; 
Enquist 1985; Grafen 1990; Adams & Mesterton-Gibbons 1995). While evolutionary biologists 
                                                                                                                                                       
because the effect (the response) has evolved to be affected by the act or structure.   
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have been documenting examples of costly signaling among non-human animals,
3 economists 
have  been  documenting  qualifying  human  examples  from  field  studies  and  laboratory 
experiments.
4 Yet, despite the growing catalogue of “costly signal” examples, the theory used to 
justify their evolution only helps explain a small fraction of human signal phenomena.  
We  are  interested  in  the  use  of  less  understood  “cheap”  signals  (e.g.,  personalized 
messages, promises of reciprocation, and apologies) that do not directly affect payoffs of the 
game, or require substantial costs for production, yet are common features of trust-based social 
contracts. Personalized communication that reveals something about the sender may facilitate 
social contracts (Buchan et al. 2002; Ridings et al. 2002, Zheng et al. 2002) by decreasing social 
distance, raising solidarity, and signaling the cues of familiarity that are normally associated with 
trustworthy relationships. Bohnet & Frey (1999) demonstrate that personal identification, even 
when only one-way, leads to efficient outcomes in dyadic interactions. Promises and non-binding 
messages by trustees have been shown to increase cooperation (Orbell et al. 1988, Rubin & 
Brown  1975;  Kerr  &  Kaufman-Gilliland  1994,  Elingsen  &  Johannesson  2004;  Charness  & 
Dufwenberg 2006). Explanations and apologies have also been shown to have great effect on 
eliciting  forgiveness  (Lewicki  &  Bunker  1996;  Girard  &  Mullet  1997;  Girard  et  al.  2002; 
McCullough et al. 1997, 1998; Ohbuchi et al. 1989; Tavuchis 1991; Witvliet et al. 2002; Benoit 
& Drew 1997) and ensuring future trust (De Cremer et al. 2010), especially when expressing an 
offender’s guilt over past actions (Wubben et al. 2009) and when combined with offers to engage 
in atonement (Gibson et al. 1999). These remedial strategies are based on cheap signals (which 
presents us with the credibility problem identified by signaling theory), raising the questions of 
                                                 
3 e.g.  the roars  of  red  deer,  Cervus elaphus  (Clutton-Brock  &  Albon  1979);  spotting  by  Thompson’s  gazelles, 
Gazella thomsonii (Fitzgibbon & Fanshawe 1988); musth in male African elephants  Loxodonta africana (Poole 
1987, 1989); and tail display of peacocks, Pavo cristatus (Petrie et al. 1991; Zahavi & Zahavi 1997). 
4 Spence (1973, 1974) has argued that the years one has spent getting an education and earning degrees signal  not 
only  intelligence, but  also commitment to long -term investments and the ability to work effectively within a 
structured institution to prospective employers. On average, these are qualities without which degrees become too 
costly for unintelligent, uncommitted, or undisciplined people to get. If degrees were easy to get, they would not be 
reliable proxies for a worker’s propensity to be productive. Camerer (1988) suggests that an engagement ring also 
functions as a costly signal of a suitor’s intentions to engage in a lifetime of familial production, whereas “the lusty 
bachelor whose planning extends only to dawn cannot afford such costly investments” (p. S183). Gambetta (2009) 
describes how in prisons inmates use costly signals of “toughness” that only those with certain qualities can afford: 
scars from knife stabs or bullet wounds (indicating that one has been through fights yet survived), willingness to 
engage  in  fighting,  and  even  self-inflicted  harm  (demonstrating  one’s  ability  to  tolerate  pain).  In  a  recently 
laboratory study, Fehrler and Przepiorka (2011) demonstrate that donors to charity are both expected to be and 
found to be more trustworthy in social exchange than non-donors.  
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how do people attempt using cheap signals, when do they actually "work", and who benefits 
from their use?  
We  suggest that by  imposing cost (after discovering signals were  false)  on dishonest 
signalers (e.g., by excluding them from future trust-based exchanges or by spreading negative 
reputational  information  that  will  cause  others  to  exclude  them),  receivers  can  make  the 
propensity to engage in false signaling effectively “costly” enough that dishonest signalers do 
not  gain  net  benefits  from  sending  false  signals.  We  are  careful  to  point  out  that  while 
sanctioning  of  false  signals  can  reduce  the  frequency  of  their  use  in  a  population,  it  is  not 
expected to drive them entirely to extinction. In fact, where opportunity costs of forgone trust-
based  exchange  are  larger,  the  tolerable  proportion  of  dishonest  signals  to  honest  signals  is 
larger. Specifically, the logic of error management theory (for a review see Haselton & Nettle 
2006)  predicts  that  despite  the  existence  of  false  signaling  and  the  costs  of  receiving  false 
signals, signals will tend to be received when opportunity costs associated with not receiving true 
signals  of  trustworthiness  (from  forgone  advantageous  exchange)  are  greater  than  costs 
associated with receiving false signals of trustworthiness (from pursued trust-based exchange 
that produced a loss). The economically justified tolerance of some false signals also predicts 
that  individuals  will  exploit  opportunities  to  profit  by  using  false  signals  to  conceal 
untrustworthiness. 
In sum, we argue that cheap signals can evolve based on the calculus of their production 
and reception costs, but that for this to happen, they should be more profitable on average to both 
sender and receiver than in their absence. Following this logic, we expect that cheap signals can 
be used to encourage new trust and restore trust that has been damaged, but that in order to do so 
reliably,  these  signals  must  yield  relatively  greater  benefits  to  both  signaler  and  target  on 
average. In the laboratory, our experimental design allows us to hone in on participants’ use of 
the  cheap  signaling  opportunities  provided.  Investigating  whether  these  cheap  signals,  so 
important to our everyday trust-based interactions, are alive and well in the laboratory, we make 
several predictions. First, we predict that trustees whose actions  have already produced  cues 
establishing their trustworthy reputations (by keeping promises and  not succumbing to  more 
profitable opportunism) will be less incentivized (than previously untrusted trustees, or trustees 
whose reputations indicate untrustworthiness) to spend time and effort constructing messages to 
persuade  investors  to  trust  them.  Previously  untrusted  trustees  who  have  no  established  
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trustworthiness to rely on and untrustworthy trustees  (i.e., promise-breakers) are expected to 
make use of promises and messages to affect investors’ decisions to trust. We expect that when 
used and “working” to affect investors’ trust, signals conveying a trustworthy propensity will 
provide benefits to both investor and trustee on average. 
 
1.3. Present Study  
Our experiment is based on a version of the “investment game” by Berg, Dickhaut & 
McCabe (1995). In our experiment we use two consecutive trust games to study how “cheap” 
signals such as promises and messages are used to restore damaged trust and encourage new trust 
where  it did  not previously  exist. In these games, trustees  made  non-binding promises, then 
investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees decided how much income to return. 
After the unexpected second game was announced, but before it commenced, trustees could send 
a  one-way  message.  This  naturalistic  quasi-experimental  design  allowed  us  to  observe  the 
endogenous  emergence  of  trust-relevant  behaviors  and  focus  on  naturally  occurring  “cheap” 
remedial strategies used by promise-breakers and distrusted trustees, their effects on investors, 
and subsequent behaviors. In the first game 18.8% of trusted trustees broke promises and 16.6% 
of trustees were distrusted. Promise-breakers used cheap signals in the form of promises of larger 
than previously promised returns (a signal of intended atonement) and messaging (usually with 
apology) to restore damaged trust. Trustees who were distrusted in the  first game used  new 
promises  closer  to  a  50/50  split  and  messaging  to  encourage  trust  in  the  second  game.  On 
average, investments paid off (for investors and trustees) in each game, netting greater earnings 
than non-investments.  
Theories of reciprocity predict that individuals will regulate their willingness to deliver 
benefits (i.e., to trust) based on their expectations of another’s trustworthiness. We expect that 
selection pressures derived  from this  incentive  structure have put a premium on signals that 
convey trustworthiness, conceal untrustworthiness, and restore trustworthiness following damage 
to others’ trust. We test our predictions from signaling theory concerning the conditions under 
which we expect to see cheap signals “working” to affect trust, and providing benefits for signal 
senders and receivers. Special attention is given to how promises are used to encourage trust 




2. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment was conducted at Chapman University’s ESI laboratory. 458 participants 
(229  pairs)  were recruited  from  a  standard  campus-wide  subject  pool  for  participation  in  an 
experiment that could last up to 45 minutes. Participants interacted with each other anonymously 
over a local computer network. The experiment, which lasted an average of 35 minutes total, 
proceeded as follows. Upon arrival, participants in the experiment were told that they would 
receive $7 for participation, to be paid at the end of the experiment. Participants then received 
instructions (see Appendix A) for a single trust game (with no indication of a subsequent game to 
follow). 
Subjects  were  assigned  to  one  of  two  roles:  “Participant  A”  for  the  investor  or 
“Participant B” for the trustee. First, the trustee chose a dollar amount from $0 to $20 that he 
promised to send back to the investor, should the investor choose IN. Specifically, the trustee 
completed  the  following  statement:  “I  (Participant  B)  promise  to  transfer  back  $___  of  my 
income  to  you  (Participant  A)  if  you  choose  IN”.  This  statement  was  not  binding.  That  is, 
trustees were not obligated to transfer back the amount promised to the investor, and both trustee 
and investor knew this. The computer conveyed the trustee’s statement to the investor and then 
the investor chose either IN or OUT. If the investor chose OUT, the investor received $5 and the 
trustee $0. If the investor chose IN, then the trustee received $20 income. In such a case, after 
receiving $20 (the “income”), the trustee chose a dollar amount from $0 to $20 to send back to 
the trustee. 
After the first trust game had been completed, participants were given instructions (see 
Appendix  A)  indicating  that  a  second trust  game  identical  to the  first  would  follow.  In  this 
second trust game, participants were paired with the same partner and played the same role as in 
the first game. However, prior to the second game, the trustee was given an opportunity to use a 
text box to send a one-way message to the investor (e.g., to apologize for the broken promise) 
and to make a new promise (e.g., to signal intended atonement). Trustees were instructed that “in 
these  messages,  no  one  is  allowed  to  identify  him  or  herself  by  name,  number,  gender,  or 
appearance”, but that other than these restrictions, trustees could “say anything in the message.” 
If trustees wished not to send a message they were instructed to “simply click on the send button 
without  having  typed  anything  in  the  message  box.”  The  computer  conveyed  the  trustee’s 
message and promise to the appropriate  investor, and then the second trust game began. We  
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specified that the second game was the last and final part of the experiment (i.e., there would be 
no subsequent games).
5 
There were 25 experimental sessions. Each session had between 10  and 24 participants. 
The average experimental earnings, including  $7 for arriving to the experiment on time  and 
participating, were $25, ranging from a low of $7  to a high of $47. No  participant participated 
more than once, and no participant had prior experience with a similar game environment.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Game 1 
We expect trustees to promise investors transfers of at least $6 (minimally higher than the 
payoff to the investor if he chooses OUT), and closer to the focal point of $10 – an even split, but 
less than $20. Promises of $20, if honored, would not provide financial benefit to the promise-
makers and are therefore not expected. Wary that trustees’ have less incentive to honor promises 
closer  to  $20  than  to  the  50/50  split  of  $10,  we  also  expect  that  investors  should  be  more 
suspicious of the veracity of  larger promises and  therefore be  less  likely to invest in  higher 
promises. Trustees who have been trusted should tend to make good on their promises (or, at 
least, yield returns on investments that are profitable to investors on average). These predictions 
stand in stark contrast to the set of rational choice predictions that expect non-binding promises 
to have no effect on investors. According to rational choice theory, trustees who receive incomes 
should  return  nothing  (despite  what  they  may  have  promised)  and,  based  on  this,  investors 
should always choose to not invest (regardless of the promise they received).  
Figure 1 displays the aggregate distribution of investment and promise-keeping decisions 
in the experiment, while Figure 2 displays the distribution of promises made by trustees in Game 
1. In Game 1, trustees on average promised to return $9.20 (SD=2.38) out of $20 and 83.4% 
(191/229) of investors chose IN.  
We evaluate whether the use of Game 1 promises affected investor willingness to make 
trust-based investments, and whether investments made based on promises resulted in greater 
benefits (than non-investments) for both  investor and trustee in Game 1. The distribution of 
promises in Figure 2 indicates that investors who chose IN received promises in the range of $6-
                                                 
5 After each trust game subjects were also asked to fill out a 20 item survey in which they reported their emotional 
states consequent on their decisions, game interactions, and resulting outcomes. Analysis and discussion of the 
mediating roles of emotions are not included in this paper.  
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$19 (99% of the time) and the most commonly received promise was for $10 (more than 50% of 
the time), while the investors who chose OUT received lower promises on average (i.e., $8.61 
(SD=4.33)  versus  $9.31  (SD=1.75);  Wilcoxon-Mann  Whitney  test,  p-value=0.01,  n1=191, 
n2=38), and received either relatively high or relatively low promises overall. To confirm this 
observation, we estimated the effect with probit models as in Table 1 (specifications 1 and 2), 
where the dependent variable is the investment decision in Game 1 (Invest1) and the independent 
variables  are  the  promise  by  trustee  (Promise1)  and  the  promise  squared  (Promise1sqr).  In 
specification  (1),  the  Promise1  variable  is  insignificant,  indicating  that  there  is  no  linear 
relationship between the probability of investment and the promised amount. On the other hand, 
in specification (2), the Promise1 and Promise1sqr variables are both significant, indicating that 
the probability of investment is significantly higher for the moderate promises (e.g., $10 or 50% 
of the income). 
Game  1  investments  made  based  on  promises  resulted  in  greater  benefits  (than  not 
investing) for both investor and trustee in Game 1 since investors who chose IN received back 
$8.19 on average, which is substantially higher than their original endowment of $5 (Wilcoxon 
signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=191). Compared to the $0 earned by untrusted trustees, trusted 
trustees earned an average of $11.81 in Game 1 (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney test, p-value<0.001, 
n1=38, n2=191). The OLS estimation of specifications (3) and (4) in Table 1 indicates that the 
amount returned by trustee (Return1) has a non-linear relationship with the promised amount 
(Promise1, Promise1sqr). Specifically, returns are significantly lower for the relatively high and 
relatively low promises. This estimation provides evidence consistent with our prediction that 
those investors who chose OUT when faced with relatively low or high promises (Figure 2), 
would  have  done  so  out  of  anticipation  of  lower  investor  payoffs  that  we  observe  from 
investments in those promises. 
For the investors who chose IN, the average amount returned of $8.19 was significantly 
lower than the average promise of $9.31 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n1=n2=191). 
Despite  average  returns  being  lower  than  promised,  we  find  that  promises  of  future  returns 
tended to be veridical; 81.2% of trusted promises (155/191) were kept (i.e., the amount returned 
was equal to or greater than the promise), and 18.8% (36/191) were broken (i.e., the amount 
returned was less than the promise). Below we will refer to “promise-keepers”, meaning those 
who exactly kept or exceeded their promised returns when invested in. “Promise-breakers” will  
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be used below to exclusively refer to those who returned less than they promised to return when 
invested in (regardless of whether the return was profitable to the investor). 
 
3.2. Game 2 
While  cheap  signals  are  manipulated  by  trustees,  affect  investors,  and  provide  net 
benefits to both investors and trustees in Game 1, facilitating profitable trust-based exchanges 
where previous reputations had not been established, Game 2 provides us a relatively different 
game environment in which to study cheap signals. In Game 2, reputations have been established 
for 83.4% of trustees (in terms of demonstrated trustworthiness), and 100% of investors (in terms 
of demonstrated trust) – raising the question of whether the use of cheap signals will still matter 
where cues of willingness to trust and act trustworthy have been established. 
On  average,  trustees  promised  to  return  $9.79  in  Game  2,  a  larger  amount  than  the 
average of $9.20 promised in Game 1 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=229), which 
resulted  in  87.3%  (200/229)  of  investors  choosing  IN,  only  slightly  more  than  the  83.4% 
(191/229)  of  IN  decisions  made  in  Game  1  (Fisher's  exact  test,  p-value=0.59,  n=229).  We 
consider whether investor and trustee reputations established in Game 1 and the new promises 
issued  in  Game  2  affect  investment  decisions.  The  estimation  of  probit  models  in  Table  2 
(specifications 1 and 2) indicates that the decision to invest in Game 2 (Invest2) mainly depends 
on the promise in Game 2 (Promise2, Promise2sqr), with no significant effects found for Game 
1 distrusted versus trusted trustees (Distrusted1) or for Game 1 promise-keepers versus promise-
breakers (Broken1). In the sections below we further explore the effect of promises and messages 
on Game 2 investments within the subsamples aggregated by Game 1 decisions. 
We evaluate whether the use of Game 2 promises and the extent of promise-breaking in 
Game 1 affected investor willingness to make trust-based investments, and whether investments 
made based on new promises and the extent to which promises were previously broken resulted 
in greater benefits (than from non-investment) for both investor and trustee in Game 2. Overall, 
the investments made in Game 2 again paid off since their investors received an average $8.73 
return from their investment choice IN, which is significantly higher than the OUT payoff of $5 
(Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n=200). The estimation of specifications (3) and (4) in 
Table 2 indicates that, similar to Game 1, returns in Game 2 (Return2) depend on promises made 
in Game 2, although linearly this time (Promise2). In addition, returns negatively depend on the  
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extent of the broken promise in Game 1 (Promise1-Return1), suggesting that trustees’ extent of 
untrustworthiness (defined by the amount which a return was less than promised) in Game 1 is 
predictive of earnings that investors can expect in Game 2. Overall, similar to Game 1, promises 
of profitable returns on investment in Game 2 tended to be veridical; 75% of promises (150/200) 
were  kept  or  exceeded,  and  25.0%  (50/200)  were  broken.  In  the  sections  below  we  further 
explore  the  effect  of  promises  and  messages  on  Game  2  earnings  within  the  subsamples 
aggregated by Game 1 decisions. 
 
3.2.1. Game 1 Promise-Keepers 
For  the  subset  of  155  promise-keeping  trustees  (i.e.,  those  who  did  not  break  their 
promises in Game 1), we observe slightly higher average promises in Game 2. Figure 3 displays 
the histogram of promises made in Game 2 by 155 promise-keepers from Game 1. These trustees 
promised to return an average of $9.46 in Game 2, which is higher than their average promise of 
$9.02 in Game 1 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-value<0.01, n1=n2=155). 
Perhaps as a consequence of Game 2  promises close to 50/50 splits of income, 92.3% of 
Game 2 investors in Game 1 promise-keepers (143/155) chose IN. Note that the investment rate 
of  92.3%  is  higher  (Wilcoxon-Mann  Whitney  test,  p-value=0.007,  n1=155,  n2=229)  than  the 
investment rate of 83.4% in Game 1 (191/229). While this rate increase in trust may be explained 
in part by updated promises in Game 2 ($9.46 versus $9.02), it can also be explained by the 
profitable  returns  transferred,  which  for  promise-keepers  was  always  the  amount  that  they 
promised or more. Specifications (1) and (2) in Table 3 support the conjectures that new Game 2 
promises  and  Game  1  returns  by  promise-keepers  affect  Game  2  investments.
6 Specifically, 
specification (1) indicates that  Game 2 investment decisions (Invest2) are positively correlated 
with  returns  in  Game  1  (Return1)  and  non-empty  messages  (Message).  Specification  (2) 
indicates that when promises are updated nonlinearly, Game 2 investment decisions (Invest2) are 
positively correlated with updated Game 2 promises (Promise2, Promise2sqr) and non-empty 
messages (Message). 
We predicted that – due to their established reputations of trustworthiness (as compared 
to either promise-breakers or distrusted trustees) – Game 1 promise-keepers were relatively less 
                                                 
6 Note that in estimating these regressions we cannot include both Return1 and Promise1 since for promise-keepers 
they are perfectly collinear.  
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incentivized to spend time and effort constructing messages to persuade investors to choose IN in 
Game 2, and so would send both shorter messages and a greater frequency of empty messages in 
Game 2. Game 1 promise-keepers’ messages contained fewer words than messages from both 
Game 1 untrusted trustees and Game 1 promise-breakers (M=11.41 versus M=22.9, Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, p<0.01, n1=155, n2=74). Comparatively, Game 1 promise-keepers’ messages were 
also more frequently empty (20%  versus 11% of the time,  Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.06, 
n1=155, n2=74). 
We evaluate whether investments made based on new promises and non-empty messages 
resulted in benefits for both investor and trustee in Game 2, and whether these signals were 
reliable indicators of subsequent trustee behaviors. Investments in Game 1 promise-keepers paid 
off for investors choosing IN in Game 2. These investors received an average of $8.62 from 
trustees,  as  opposed  to  the  $5  earned  from  OUT  (Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test,  p-value<0.01, 
n=143), with 83.9% (120/143) of the promises kept or exceeded, and 16.1% (23/143) broken. 
Compared to $0 earned by untrusted Game 1 promise-keepers in Game 2, promise-keepers also 
profited from trusted promises in Game 2 earning $11.38 on average (Wilcoxon-Mann Whitney 
test,  p-value<0.01,  n1=12,  n2=143).  Specification  (3)  in  Table  3  indicates  a  positive  linear 
relationship for Game 2 returns (Return2) and promises (Promise2), again further confirming 
that  the  trusted  promises  are  reliable  cues  of  returns  (which  are  profitable  on  average).  No 
significant  effect  of  promise-keepers  messages  (Message)  was  seen  on  Game  2  returns 
(Return2). 
 
3.2.2. Game 1 Promise-Breakers 
A major question our data address concerns what happens when a fresh opportunity for 
cooperation arises between two parties subsequent to a violation of trust: how trustees react, how 
investors respond, and what outcomes are achieved. Here we focus on the 18.8% (36/191) of 
pairs where promises were broken in Game 1 (i.e., where the amount returned was lower than the 
promise).  These  broken  promises  represent  breaches  of  trust,  and  the  relationships  that 
immediately follow are considered to have damaged trust (i.e., because trust-based expectations 
were not met). A central question motivating this study is, “can cheap signals restore the trust 
damaged by broken promises in a previous interaction?”   
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We consider  larger new promises (i.e., where Promise2>Promise1)  made  by Game 1 
promise-breakers  to  be  intentional  remedial  strategies  which  we  call  promises  of  intended 
atonement.  If  honored,  returns  from  a  promise  of  intended  atonement  can  be  construed  as 
contributions towards restitution of the previously promised amount, expected but lost when 
Promise1 was trusted and broken.  Figure 4 displays the histogram of promises made in Game 2 
by 36 promise-breakers. Promise-breakers promised $12.11 in Game 2, which is significantly 
higher  than  their  promise  of  $10.58  in  Game  1  (Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test,  p-value=0.01, 
n1=n2=36) – signaling intended atonement (i.e., Promise2-Promise1 > 0). It appears that a signal 
of intended atonement partially restores trust, since 69.4% (25/36) of investors whose trust was 
damaged  in  Game  1  chose  IN  again.  While  promises  of  intended  atonement  could  signal 
intention  to  provide  an  “economic”  contribution  towards  restituting  the  previously  promised 
amount lost, victims of damaged trust might also require additional indications that the trustee 
has changed his investor-regarding disposition before re-extending trust and again choosing IN.  
In addition to larger new promises, we also find that Game 1 promise-breakers frequently 
used  messages  whose  features  (see  below)  we  assume  were  intentionally  manipulated  to 
persuade investors to choose IN in Game 2. Table B1 in Appendix B reports all messages that 
were sent by 36 promise-breakers. Analyzing the messages, we find that 83.3% (30/36) of the 
messages  have  some  content.  Game  1  promise-breakers’  messages  contain  more  words than 
messages  from  Game  1  promise-keepers  (M=19.1  versus  M=11.4,  Wilcoxon  rank-sum  test, 
p=0.03,  n1=36,  n2=155)  whom  we  assume  –  due  to  their  established  reputations  of 
trustworthiness – were not as incentivized to construct a message with content for the purpose of 
persuading  investors  to  choose  IN  in  Game  2.  Furthermore,  we  find  that  80%  (24/30)  of 
messages with content restore trust (i.e., investors choose IN in Game 2 after suffering broken 
promises  in  Game  1),  as  opposed  to  only  16.7%  (1/6)  of  messages  without  content.  These 
differences are significant (Fisher’s exact test, p-value<0.01, n=36). These observed differences 
in larger new promise and message style indicate that most Game 1 promise-breakers made use 
of both a signal of intended atonement (a larger new promise) and personalized communication 
(a one-way ad libitum message) to restore damaged trust and persuade investors to re-trust them.  
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We expect that the use of apologies (i.e., with remorse, regret, or sorrow stemming from 
acknowledgment  of  offense)
7 should  increase  investors’  willingness  to  reinvest  in  promise-
breakers. Out of 30 messages with content, we coded 10 messages as apologies.
8 We find that 
90.0% (9/10) of apologizers were retrusted in  comparison to only 61.5% (16/26) of non -
apologizers (Fisher’s exact test, p-value=0.10, n=36), indicating that messages with apology are 
more  likely to restore trust after broken promises than empty  messages or messages without 
apology. 
To study the link between messages expressing regret for an offensive action (apology) 
and intensions to demonstrate atonement (new larger promises) we evaluate whether apologies 
issued  in  the  experiment  actually  correlated  with  larger  promises  of  intended  reciprocations. 
Among Game 1 promise-breakers, the restitution promised (i.e., Promise2-Promise1) by signals 
of intended atonement is significantly higher for those participants who issued an apology than 
for  those  who  did  not  ($3.00  versus  $0.65;  Wilcoxon  rank-sum  test,  p-value=0.06,  n1=10, 
n2=20). Promise-breakers who sent a non-apology message (20/30) increased promises by $0.65 
(SD=3.20), while promise-breakers who sent an apology message (10/30) increased promises by 
$3.00 (SD=2.62). When compared to the whole population of trustees, the difference is even 
more striking. For 10 trustees who issued apologies the increase in promises is more than six 
times higher than  for all  other 219 trustees ($3.00 versus $0.48; Wilcoxon rank-sum test,  p-
value<0.01, n1=10, n2=219), indicating that apologetic trustees increased their second promises 
more than all other trustees. 
                                                 
7 There are two commonly accepted definitions of apology, one broader and one more narrow. Throughout this 
paper, we focus on the narrower definition unless we specify otherwise. The broader definition of the word apology 
comes from the Late Latin apologia, “a speech in defense”, which itself derives from Greek apologos “an account, 
story” (apo: “from, off”; logos: “speech”). According to Webster’s Revised Unabridged Dictionary (Porter 1913) 
“An apology, in the original sense of the word, was a pleading off from some charge or imputation, by explaining 
and defending  one's  principles  or  conduct.  It  therefore  amounted  to  a  vindication.  One  who  offers  an apology, 
admits himself to have been, at least apparently, in the wrong, but brings forward some palliating circumstance, or 
tenders a  frank acknowledgment,  by  way  of  reparation.” The more recent  Merriam  Webster  Online  Dictionary 
(2011) defines apology first more broadly as “1a: a formal justification, b: excuse”, and second, more narrowly, as 
“an admission of error or discourtesy accompanied by an expression of regret”.  Other sources indicate that the more 
commonly  accepted  definition  is  the  narrow  one.  For  example,  the  American  Heritage  Dictionary  (2011)  first 
defines apology as “Written or spoken expression of one's regret, remorse, or sorrow for having insulted, failed, 
injured,  or  wronged  another”.  Conversely,  American  Heritage’s  second  definition,  “a  defense,  excuse,  or 
justification in speech or writing, as for a cause or doctrine”, is consistent with Webster’s first.  
8 23 messages can be qualified as apologies in the broader sense (i.e., an explicit or implicit  acknowledgment of 
another’s offense received which, in the context of this experiment, is a trusted promise that was broken). Using 
broader definition of apologies, we find no substantial differences in investment rates between apology and no 
apology (78.2% versus 85.7%).  
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Thus far, we have only considered the independent effects of intended atonement (new 
larger  promises)  and  messages  in  restoring  damaged trust,  but  recognize  that these  remedial 
strategies are often used together. Next, we estimate probit regressions as in Table 4 to identify 
how these remedial strategies work in conjunction. Specification (1) indicates that the two most 
significant predictors of trust in Game 2 (Invest2) are new larger promises (Promise2-Promise1) 
and non-empty messages (Message). Specification (2) shows that in addition trust is negatively 
affected  by  the  magnitude  of  broken  promise  in  Game  1  (Promise1-Return1).  These  results 
indicate that investors respond to the combined effects of adjusted promises and longer messages 
by making trust-based investments in Game 2 in previously distrusted trustees. 
Evolutionary  theory  argues  that  signals  like  apologies  and  promises  of  intended 
atonement  should  have  evolved  only  if  they  provided  net  benefits  to  both  the  senders  and 
receivers  of  the  signals.  We  evaluate  whether  Game  1  promise-breakers’  signals  resulted  in 
benefits  for  both  investor  and  trustee  in  Game  2,  and  whether  these  signals  were  reliable 
indicators of subsequent trustee behaviors.  Investors in Game 1 promise-breakers were returned 
on average $7.28, which is significantly higher than the OUT payoff of $5 (Wilcoxon signed 
rank test, p-value=0.05, n=25). Moreover, Game 1 promise-breakers returned significantly more 
in  Game  2  than  in  Game  1  ($7.28  versus  $4.60;  Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test,  p-value<0.01, 
n1=n2=25). This is also true when we look at investments in the subset of 9 out of 10 trustees 
who explicitly issued apologies and where retrusted ($6.78 versus $4.22; Wilcoxon signed rank 
test, p-value=0.06, n1=n2=9). Although on average investments in Game 2 paid off, we still find 
that 60.0% (15/25) of trustees who broke their  promises  in Game 1 (and were subsequently 
retrusted), broke their promises again in Game 2 – almost irrespective of the apologies and new 
promises. Apologies were not veridical on average;
9 only 4/9 (44.4%) retrusted apologizers kept 
Game 2 promises,
10 a greater but not significantly different  (Fisher's exact test, p-value=0.53, 
n=25) proportion than 6/16 (37.5%) retrusted non-apologizers who kept Game 2 promises. From 
specifications (3) and (4) in  Table 4, it appears that the  most significant predictor for return in 
Game 2 (Return2) from a promise breaker is a sent message with content (Message). 
  
3.2.3. Game 1 Distrusted 
                                                 
9 Likewise, of the 18 more broadly defined apologies that were retrusted, only 44.4% were veridical. 
10 8 of these 9 apologizers also signaled intended atonement.  
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As mentioned, 38 out of 229 trustees (16.6%) were not trusted in Game 1 (see Figure 1). 
We attribute this distrust to the fact that these trustees offered either relatively high or relatively 
low promises (see right panel of Figure 2). In particular, in Game 1, 55.3% (21/38) of distrusted 
trustees promised less than $9 while another 10.5% (4/38) of them promised more than $11. As 
with our Game 1 predictions of trusted promises, we expect that distrusted trustees would adjust 
their promises towards the modal and more trusted promise of $10, that these adjustments would 
affect decisions to invest, and that investments made based on adjusted promises would benefit 
both the investor and trusted.  
First  we  evaluate  whether  Game  1  distrusted  trustees  adjusted  their  promises  as  we 
expected  and  if  adjustments  of  promises  by  Game  1  distrusted  trustees  affect  investment 
decisions. Trustees who were distrusted in Game 1 promised an average of $8.92 in Game 2, 
which is similar to their average promise of $8.61 in Game 1 (Wilcoxon signed rank test, p-
value=0.45, n1=n2=38), yet most investors (84.2% or 32/38) who did not trust in Game 1 chose 
IN in Game 2. Figure 5 displays the histogram of promises made in Game 2 by the 38 trustees 
who  were  distrusted  in  Game  1.  Distrusted
 trustees  changed  their  distribution  of  promises 
towards more equal splits:  66.7% (14/21) of trustees who promised  less than $9  in Game 1 
increased their Game 2 promises and 100% (4/4) of trustees who promised more than $11 in 
Game  1  decreased  their  Game  2  promises.  Correspondingly,  among  previously  un-trusting 
investors, 92.6% (13/14) of those who received increased promises and 100% (4/4) of those who 
received the decreased promises chose IN in Game 2.  
Next, we analyze whether new trust in previously distrusted trustees can be statistically 
attributed to how distrusted trustees utilized messages and recalibrated promises. We expected 
that distrusted trustees would construct longer messages with content (and be more incentivized 
to do so than trustees who had already established reputations of trustworthiness) to persuade 
investors to choose IN in Game 2. Table B2 in Appendix B reports the messages that were sent 
by 38 trustees who were distrusted in Game 1. Analyzing these messages, we find that 94.7% 
(36/38)  of  the  messages  used  by  distrusted  trustees  have  some  content.  Game  1  distrusted 
messages contain  more words than  messages  from Game 1 promise-keepers (M=26.6 versus 
M=11.4, Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p<0.01, n1=38, n2=155). These data suggest that distrusted 
trustees use both promises adjusted towards 50/50 divisions of income and longer messages to 
persuade investors to trust them. The estimation of specification (1) in Table 5 indicates that the  
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investment  decisions  in  Game  2  (Invest2)  are  positively  correlated  with  new  up-regulated 
promises in Game 2 (Promise2sqr) and the length of the message (Wordcount), indicating that 
investors respond to the adjusted promises and longer messages used by distrusted trustees by 
making trust-based investments in Game 2.
11 Overall, in Game 2, after trustees sent messages 
and updated their promises, 84.2% (32/38) of  previously untrusting investors chose IN. This is 
very similar to the original investment rate of 83.4% in Game 1. 
Finally, we evaluate whether  the cheap signals successfully used by  Game 1 distrusted 
trustees’ to build new trust resulted in benefits for both investor and trustee in Game 2, and 
whether  these  signals  were  reliable  indicators  of  subsequent  trustee  behaviors.  Game  2 
investments made in previously distrusted trustees paid off for investors and trustees. Investors in 
Game 1 distrusted trustees were returned on average $6.88, which is significantly higher than the 
OUT  payoff  of  $5  (Wilcoxon  signed  rank  test,  p-value=0.05,  n=32).  Trustees  who  were 
distrusted in Game 1, but then trusted in Game 2, kept or exceeded their promises 62.5% of time 
(20/32). Nevertheless, 37.5% (12/32) of previously distrusted trustees who were trusted in Game 
2 broke their promises – more (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p=0.048, n1=32, n2=191) than the 18.8% 
of trusted trustees who broke their promises in Game 1. The estimation of specification (2) in 
Table 5 shows very weak correlation between Game 1 distrusted trustees’ returns in Game 2 
(Return2) and their promises (Promise2, Promise2sqr), suggesting that the extent to which the 
37.5%  of Game 1 distrusted trustees break their Game 2 promises is noteworthy. It is possible 
that the some newly trusted trustees who broke their promises in Game 2 did so in order to 
punish investors for their distrust in Game 1. By doing so these presumed punishers ended up 
earning an average of $17.42 in two games, closer to the average earning of $21.99 across two 
games for Game1 trusted trustees, than the average earnings of $10.55 for newly trusted trustees 
who did not break promises in Game2.  
 
4. Discussions and Conclusions 
Opportunities for mutual gains often exist where previous trust-based exchange histories 
have not yet been developed, or where trust has been damaged by a failure to meet expectations. 
Our natural experiment demonstrates that in these situations people use (i.e. send and receive) 
                                                 
11 The variable Message is omitted from estimation of specification (1) because log-likelihood does not converge as 
the variable Message is almost perfectly collinear with Constant.   
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cheap signals to encourage new trust and rebuild damaged trust, despite the risks that these 
signals may be dishonest.  
With promises used to encourage new trust in Game 1, and among untrusted trustees in 
Game 2, we see that IN decisions by investors are higher when promised returns are within the 
range that would provide benefits to both signal sender and receiver, and especially when the 
promised split is even (where conflict between individual incentives is balanced). We suggest 
two  reasons  why  non-binding  promises  were  effectively  used  to  establish  new  trust  in  our 
experiment.  
First, if the promises themselves are not costly, then the credence they are given by 
investors may be driven by a default assumption that future exclusion of cheaters and the spread 
of negative gossip concerning their untrustworthy reputations will make the cost of defection 
high enough (e.g., see Delton et al. 2011). For investors in our games, what is certain is that the 
investment decision may be the last investment decision (because Game 1 is describe as a single 
interaction with no indication that future interactions in the pairing are to be expected, and the 
unexpected Game 2 is described as a single interaction with assurance that no further games will 
occur). Investors’ ability to use exclusion based on discovery of broken promises is therefore not 
a certainty in either interaction. Yet, despite the propositional information of these games, the 
mind is not designed for terminal anonymous interactions. We expect that evolved psychologies 
bring  psychological  contracts  with  an  assumption  of  excludability  into  the  lab,  which  lends 
credence to the signals (but not for reasons provided by the game environment). While we find 
this argument convincing, we do not present direct evidence to support it. 
Second, despite promises not being costly (i.e., dishonest promise  makers will profit 
when trusted), potential receivers of these signals need to maximize their tradeoffs between costs 
of  type  I  errors  (i.e.,  losses  of  endowment  from  making  trust-based  investments  based  on 
promises that are not honest) and the costs of type II errors (i.e., losses from foregone returns 
from not making trust-based investments based on distrusting promises that were honest). Where 
opportunity  costs  of  forgone  trust-based  exchange  are  larger,  the  tolerable  proportion  of 
dishonest signals to honest signals is larger. Unlike the standard investment game that uses a 
multiplier of 3, we used a multiplier of 4 – which ultimately created a large opportunity cost for 
investors who chose OUT. Game 1 Investors who chose IN received back $8.19 on average, 
which is substantially higher than their original endowment of $5. Despite the rate of broken  
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promises  observed  in  Game  1,  trusted  promises  produced  more  profits  for  investors  than 
untrusted promises. We suspect that the signaling psychology used by senders is sensitive to the 
tradeoffs considered by investors as evidence by the non-random distribution of promises made 
and the correspondence of this distribution to promises trusted. Likewise we suspect that the 
extent to which promises are broken is a product of the net profits to investors, the amount 
originally promised, and profits to promise breakers. 
In Game 2, evidence indicates that cheap signals are manipulated by trustees and affect 
investors, even (and especially) under conditions where cues of untrustworthiness have been 
established. As we expected, messaging is not utilized effectively by Game 1 promise-keepers, 
but is used with intended effect by those who previously broke promises as well by previously 
untrusted trustees. Promise breakers specifically crafted apologies to acknowledge past offenses, 
express remorse and regret, and persuade investors that if invested in again, things would go 
better for investors. As we discussed for Game 1 promises, messages are cheap signals whose 
reliability is not guaranteed by their direct costs. We suspect that participants brought evolved 
psychologies  into  the  lab  which  evaluated  the  credence  of  messages  “as  if”  the  default 
assumption that future exclusion of cheaters and the spread of negative gossip concerning their 
untrustworthy reputations would make the cost of defection high enough. Again, we do not have 
evidence to directly support this conjecture, but we do have evidence that the decision to invest 
in promise breakers and previously untrusted trustees is statistically correlated with the message 
use,  and  that these  investments  were  more  profitable  for the  investors  and  trustees than  the 
decision to not invest would have been. When the sending and receiving of cheap signals is 
profitable  to  sender  and  receivers,  cheap  signals  are  adaptive  and  expected  to  exist  at 
evolutionary equilibrium. From this study we see evidence indicating how personal exchanges 
are often based around establishment of trust via cheap signals, and how these cheap signals can 
encourage new trust where it did not previously exist or repair trust where it had been damaged. 
Not only is this important information that could improve understanding of what to expect from 
our everyday interpersonal relationships, it is information that complements our understanding of 
how market exchange systems (where interactions often take place between non-personal entities 
such  as  firms),  politics,  law,  and  religion  are  sometimes  expected  to  work,  with  personal 
representatives making verbal and written promises of reciprocation or atonement or else issuing 
apologies and personalized messages. Both interpersonal interactions and markets are built on  
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the ancient human foundations of adaptive giving and receiving. As such, trust-based exchanges 
at any level are often based around establishment of trust via cheap signals such as claims about 
reputation, verbal contracts, and apologies. 
While the persuasive effects of apology and signals of intended atonement on restoring 
damaged trust have been clearly demonstrated in this lab experiment, it is important to note that 
the majority (60%) of investors whose trust was damaged in Game 1 and were persuaded to trust 
again in Game 2 were, again, met with broken promises. This raises the question of why humans 
might be so easily persuaded by cheap talk like apology and atonement. Our argument that future 
excludability  supports  assigning  credence  to  signals  predicts  that  if  we  would  allow  tertiary 
interactions among our participant pairings, repeated promise-breaking should make investors 
devalue cheap signals like promises and apologies and choose OUT in future rounds. We also 
suggest that for the 60% of trustees whose trust had been initially damaged, and then re-extended 
trust based on apologies only to have their trust damaged again, –may not have occurred outside 
of  the  laboratory  where  emotional  states  are  reliably  communicated  through  other  forms 
simultaneously (e.g., facial expressions, voice, body language) and in concert with additional 
reputational information and opportunities for sanctioning undesirably behavior. We suspect that 
in the “real world” of non-anonymous and face-to-face interactions, persuasive messages like 
apology and promises of intended atonement are likely more reliable and less likely to lead to 
further damaged trust because the message receiver can evaluate the veracity of a verbal message 
according  to  not  only  internal  coherence  among  cheap  talk  signals  (a  lack  of  which  might 
demonstrate intentional lying), but also the correspondence of verbal signals with other reliable 
signals (e.g., facial expressions, past demonstrations of trust or trustworthiness, tone of voice, 
eyes, body language).
12 
Based on our findings and a review of the current literature we suggest three steps that 
can be taken as a remedial strategy to  restore damaged trust. First, when trust in a relationship 
has been damaged, the offender should recognize the damage, em pathize  with  the  victim’s 
perspective, and communicate a desire to implement change in the relationship. An optimistic 
perspective on relationships fraught with damaged trust recognizes that they actually represent 
                                                 
12 Hirshleifer (1984) theorized that emotions act as “guarantors of threats and promises” and several authors (Van 
Kleef  et  al.  2004,  2006;  Sinaceur  &  Tiedens  2006,  Wubben  et  al.  2008;  Stouten  &  De  Cremer  2010)  have 
demonstrated experimentally that displays of emotion (including anger, guilt, happiness, disappointment, worry, 
regret) are used by observers for subsequent decision making in social dilemmas and negotiations.   
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opportunities to develop better relations than previously established. Second, to persuade and 
assure  victims  that  relationship  repair  is  possible  the  offender  must  signal  seriousness, 
commitment, and give indication of the value that is recognized in the other, which is the basis 
and motivation for actual change to come. In signaling recognition of relationship value it is 
important not to express a selfish welfare perspective, but instead an other-regarding or shared 
welfare  perspective.  Third,  to  actually  begin  the  process  of  changing  and  redefining  the 
relationship, an offender  must be willing to expeditiously take on costs by either sacrificing 
wealth  or  status,  or  by  taking  action  to  correct  the  previous  imbalance  of  welfare  that  was 
realized by the transgression. When corrective actions cannot be taken, signals of intent to take 
corrective actions should be used. These three steps are identified as each having independent 
effects of improving impressions of the offender (Scher & Darley 1997; Schlenker 1980) and are 
consistent with the proscriptions detailed by De Cremer (2010) for the financial world to restore 
their damaged trust with customers, as well as the conclusions that Lazare (2004) arrived at 
through thorough analysis of how apologies are used (and misused) across applications and their 
relative efficacy. 
As the natural occurrence of deceit in social exchanges is sampled and the effectiveness 
of strategies, tools, and institutions used to combat it are evaluated, practical insights are gleaned 
that can be extended to our personal lives, to the work of policy makers, and even applied to the 
handling of firms and industry affairs. We strongly encourage further efforts to uncover effective 
strategies  for  building  up  trust  where  previous  trust-based  exchange  histories  had  not  been 
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Table 1: Game 1 Determinants of Investment and Return 
Dependent variable  Invest1  Invest1  Return1  Return1 








Promise1  0.05  0.98***  -0.02  3.04*** 
    [promise in Game 1]  (0.04)  (0.18)  (0.11)  (0.46) 
Promise1sqr    -0.04***    -0.15*** 
    [promise squared]    (0.01)    (0.02) 
Constant  0.50  -4.14***  8.35***  -6.88*** 
  (0.34)  (0.92)  (1.05)  (2.41) 
Observations  229  229  191  191 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%.  
 
Table 2: Game 2 Determinants of Investment and Return 
Dependent variable  Invest2  Invest2  Return2  Return2 








Promise1  0.01  -0.15  0.20  0.46 
    [promise in Game 1]  (0.07)  (0.25)  (0.13)  (0.51) 
Promise1sqr    0.00    -0.01 
    [promise squared]    (0.01)    (0.02) 
Return1  0.06  0.10  0.19  0.15 
    [return in Game 1]  (0.10)  (0.11)  (0.22)  (0.24) 
Broken1  -0.49  -0.46  -0.17  -0.14 
    [broken promise in Game 1]  (0.43)  (0.45)  (1.09)  (1.11) 
Broken1×(Promise1-Return1)  -0.08  -0.03  -0.45*  -0.50* 
    [extent of broken promise]  (0.10)  (0.10)  (0.27)  (0.29) 
Distrusted1  0.19  0.77  0.09  -0.16 
    [not trusted in Game 1]  (0.92)  (0.98)  (2.14)  (2.19) 
Promise2  0.10**  0.56***  0.32***  -0.03 
    [promise in Game 2]  (0.04)  (0.15)  (0.12)  (0.44) 
Promise2sqr    -0.02***    0.01 
    [promise squared]    (0.01)    (0.02) 
Constant  -0.07  -1.89  1.98  2.80 
  (0.75)  (1.26)  (1.93)  (3.04) 
Observations  229  229  200  200 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 3: Game 2 Determinants of Investment and Return with Game 1 Promise-Keepers  
Dependent variable  Invest2  Invest2  Return2  Return2 








Return1  0.30***  0.14  -0.13  -0.09 
    [return in Game 1]  (0.12)  (0.16)  (0.19)  (0.21) 
Promise2  0.00  1.25***  0.97***  0.65 
    [promise in Game 2]  (0.07)  (0.36)  (0.16)  (0.71) 
Promise2sqr    -0.05***    0.01 
    [promise squared]    (0.01)    (0.03) 
Message  0.73**  0.62*  -0.31  -0.28 
    [message with content]  (0.35)  (0.38)  (0.63)  (0.63) 
Constant  -1.69*  -7.16**  0.83  2.26 
  (1.02)  (1.87)  (1.95)  (3.66) 
Observations  155  155  143  143 





Table 4: Game 2 Determinants of Investment and Return with Game 1 Promise-Breakers 
Dependent variable  Invest2  Invest2  Return2  Return2 








Promise2-Promise1  0.26**    -0.59   
    [intended atonement]  (0.12)    (0.50)   
Promise1-Return1    -0.15**    -0.46* 
    [amount of broken promise]    (0.07)    (0.25) 
Promise2  0.18  0.44  -5.03  -6.30 
    [promise in Game 2]  (0.54)  (0.53)  (4.01)  (3.71) 
Promise2sqr  -0.01  -0.01  0.21  0.25* 
    [promise squared]  (0.02)  (0.02)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
Message  2.09**  2.01**  16.49**  16.61** 
    [message with content]  (0.99)  (0.90)  (7.85)  (7.36) 
Apology  0.18  0.50  -1.04  -0.91 
    [message with apology]  (0.69)  (0.73)  (2.18)  (2.08) 
Constant  -1.91  -3.70  20.56  32.11 
  (3.21)  (3.14)  (22.30)  (20.74) 
Observations  36  36  25  25 
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table 5: Game 2 Determinants of Investment and Return with Game 1 Distrusted Trustees  
Dependent variable  Invest2  Return2 




Promise2-Promise1  0.03  -0.14 
    [intended atonement]  (0.09)  (0.21) 
Promise2  -0.50  0.14 
    [promise in Game 2]  (0.43)  (0.73) 
Promise2sqr  0.06*  0.01 
    [promise squared]  (0.04)  (0.03) 
Message    1.89 
    [message with content]    (3.81) 
Wordcount  0.03*  0.01 
    [number of words]  (0.02)  (0.04) 
Constant  0.14  2.70 
  (1.24)  (5.59) 
Observations  36  32 










































































































































































Figure 5: Distribution of Promises in the Second Game (Resulting in IN or OUT)   














































Thank you for participating in this experiment. The purpose of this experiment is to study how people make 
decisions in a particular situation. Feel free to ask us questions as they arise, by raising your hand. Please do not 
speak to other participants during the experiment. You will receive $7 for participating in this session. You may also 
receive additional money, depending on the decisions made (as described below). Upon completion of the session, 
this additional amount will be paid to you individually and privately.  
During the session, you will be paired with another person. However, no participant will ever know the 




In each pair, one person will have the role of A, and the other will have the role of B. The amount of money 
you earn depends on the decisions made in your pair. 
First, by choosing a dollar amount from $0 to $20, B indicates the proportion of a possible $20 income that 
he or she promises to transfer back to A, should A choose IN. Specifically, B will complete the following statement: 
“I  (Participant  B)  promise  to  transfer  back  ___  of  my  income  to  you  (Participant  A)  if  you  choose  IN”.  The 
computer will convey B’s statement to A, and then A and B will proceed as described below. B may still choose an 
amount to transfer back to A that is different than the amount promised. 
Having received a statement from B, A indicates whether he or she chooses IN or OUT. If A chooses OUT, 
A receives $5 and B receives $0. If A chooses IN, then B receives $20 income. In such a case, after receiving $20 

















B makes a promise: 
“I (Person B) promise to transfer back 
___ of my income to you (Person A) if 
you choose IN” 
A chooses: IN or OUT 
IN  OUT 
promise 
B chooses: the amount ($X) from $0 
to $20 to transfer back to A. 
amount X 
A’s Earnings: $5 
B’s Earnings: $0 
A’s Earnings: $X 
B’s Earnings: $20-$X  
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(This part of the instructions was handed out after the first part of the experiment was conducted.) 
  
REPETITION OF THE EXPERIMENT 
 
The same decision tasks that were just completed will be repeated again, with everyone remaining in the 




Prior to repetition of the previous decision tasks, B has an option to send a message to A. B may use a text 
box to type a message, if desired. We will allow time as needed to construct and type messages. When B’s message 
has been completed (by typing in the text box and clicking on the send button) it will be conveyed by the computer 
to the appropriate Participant A, and then A and B will proceed with decision tasks. In these messages, no one is 
allowed to identify him or herself by name, number, gender, or appearance. Other than these restrictions, B may say 
anything in the message. If you wish not to send a message, simply click on the send button without having typed 
anything in the message box. 
 
DECISION TASKS AND SURVEY (REPEATED AS BEFORE) 
 
This second set of decision tasks and the accompanying 20 item survey is the final part of the experiment. 
There will be no further tasks.  
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Appendix B: Messages 
 


















15  0  Let's split even. $10 and $10.    NO  NO  10  YES  8 
10  1  If  I  knew  there  were  2  rounds  I  would  have 
split it up even the first round.  This round I'll 
make it up to you by giving you 15 if you're IN, 
this  way  we  both  end  up  with  more  money.  
Sorry again. 
  YES  YES  15  YES  3 
10  0       NO  NO  20  YES  0 
10  0  Hey im  sorry about that I  didn't realize there 
was going to be another round.! Let me make 
things right. 
  YES  YES  15  YES  5 
10  9  i'll do the same deal as last time, sound fair?    NO  NO  15  YES  9 
10  7  to even out i will give you 13 and i will take 7    YES  NO  13  YES  10 
10  0  dooooooood we all here to make muney baby 
so why dont we just split this huney down da 
middle,    a  lil  lovin  for  da  both  of  us?  ill 
forrealze give you like 10 bucks and ill keep 10 
you dig? stay fresh ;) 
  NO  NO  10  YES  0 
10  7  How  much  would  you  want  this  time  seeing 
how  you  didn't  have  a  choice  last  time?  I'm 
willing to make it even between the two of us. 
  YES  NO  13  YES  0 
10  5  Hello A! I'm sorry I fell back on my promise, 
haha.  To  be  honest,  I'm  dead  broke  and  I 
haven't eaten all day and I'm literally about to 
run out of gas in my car, and those extra five 
dollars are going to help me out with that!  ¶ If 
you choose out the most you are going to get is 
5 more dollars, I can promise you that I'll agree 
to give you $10 if you choose in. Hopefully this 
works out! Either way, have a good one! 
  YES  YES  12  YES  12 
8  5  I only sent less than promised because I wanted 
to see what would happen 
  YES  NO  10  YES  10 
10  2  Hi, I was a little confused as to the experiment 
before. But I will stay true to this promise 
  YES  NO  9  YES  9 
13  9  lets split the money 10 and 10    NO  NO  10  YES  10 
10  8  I apologize for cheating you out of your $2  - 
normally I'm not the kind of person to do that 
sort of thing. When two people aren't face-to-
face they usually have more confidence to do 
things they wouldn't normally do. This time I 
promise I'll play fair. 
  YES  YES  9  YES  9 
10  7  I didn't know we were repeating this. This time 
I really will split 50/50 :) 
  YES  NO  10  YES  10 
11  2  I will transfer back 18 to you this time to make 
it fair ¶  so we will have the same amount. I 
promise this time. 
  YES  NO  18  YES  10 
14  11  Hi.  I  apologize  for  short  changing  you.    I 
should have been honsest and gone off the first 
example.   I  went off the third example  w/my 
self  interest  in  mind.    I'll  keep  my  word  this 
time. 
  YES  YES  18  YES  18 
11  10  10/10?    NO  NO  12  YES  7 
8  0  sorry about last time i  feel  bad......50/50  this 
time? 
  YES  YES  10  YES  0 
8  7  Strategy :)    NO  NO  10  YES  10 
10  0  I feel bad that you now only have the option of 
going  home  with  $5  so  you  should  click  in 
again and  i  will  give you $12 so  that  you go 
home  with  more  than  just  the  basic  amount 




8  6  My sincerest appologies on that last one...I do 
feel  quite  guilty ¶  and  I assure  you  that  this 
time  I  shall  keep  my  promise  with  utmost 
integrity.    You  have  my  word  as  an  honest 
gentleman. 
  YES  YES  16  YES  1 
10  7  I feel bad for promising 10 and giving you 7. If 
you  choose  in  I'll  send  you  13  so  that  we'll 
come out even. 
  YES  YES  13  YES  13 
5  1  my bad...    YES  NO  10  YES  8 
10  3  I'll  transfer  back  more  money  this  time  ¶  
actually $10 
  YES  NO  11  YES  10 
10  8  Hi ¶ I was testing if it really will let me decide 
how  much I  can  get  myself. This time I  will 
give you the right amount I promised. 
  YES  NO  10  YES  10 
10  0  This time I'll give you what I promise.  Sorry!    YES  YES  10  NO   
10  0  ok for real this time haha. The first time was a 
joke lol 
  YES  NO  15  NO   
17  0  May God bless you    NO  NO  13  NO   
10  7  In the previous exercise I wanted to see if one 
really could promise one amount and then give 
another.  After  seeing  that  it  is  possible,  I 
promise to give you the amount I state. 
  YES  NO  10  NO   
17  1  i know  that  there is  no reason you'd trust  me 
because  i  didn't  follow  through  with  my 
promise last time ¶ but if you choose in i will 
transfer all of the money that i say i will. ¶ for 
real this time. 
  YES  NO  18  NO   
10  5  Even  though  I  was  decietful  ¶  you  were  no 
worse off then had you picked OUT.  The other 
option would have still led you to $5. 
  YES  NO  5  NO   
12  5      NO  NO  20  NO   
18  4      NO  NO  12  NO   
7  6      NO  NO  9  NO   
10  5      NO  NO  8  NO   
10  7      NO  NO  10  NO    
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11  8 seems fair    8  YES  0 
16  lets go 50/50. i give you $10, i get $10. ¶ its almost christmas....    10  YES  1 
9  I want to split the money right down the middle. I will give you ten dollars and I 
will get ten dollars.  If you choose out you will get less and both of us will come 
out empty handed. This is for the benefit of both parties and  you will make 
more money in this way than you will by opting out. 
  10  YES  1 
5  hey if i transfer 9 to you will you accept ?    9  YES  8 
10  Trust me this time. Please?    10  YES  7 
10  hi! i was actually going to give you the $10 that time! You would have made 
more money! I promise to give what I promise to you this time as well! 
  8  YES  5 
11  Hello, ¶ I think $11.00 for you is a fair price for this survey and it is more than 
the $5.00 you get for choosing Out. I will keep my offer the same if you chose 
In. ¶ Thank you 
  11  YES  12 
10  Hey! Okay,  listen,  I  was  genuinely  going to  give  you ten  dollars. I think it 
makes sense for both of us to make as much money as possible. I'm not trying 
to  trick  you.  I'm  just  poor  and  want  a  few  extra  dollars  to  buy  Christmas 
presents. So could you please just be in" next time? That way we can both make 
more. I promise I am not lying to you. I know it's anonymous but please trust 
me. :(" 
  9  YES  10 
6  You click out,  you earn 5. You accept my offer,  you earn 6. It doesn't make 
any  sense to  click OUT. This is not a situation  where  my  gain affects  your 
profits  in  the  future,  this  isn't  one  business  earning  a  little  bit  and  another 
earning  a  lot  at  its  expense.  You  have  to  option  of  $6  or  $5,    without 
repercussions or any damage in the future. Me getting 0 does you no good,  all 
it does is hurt you. If you want $5,  click OUT. But it obviously makes more 
sense to click IN. 
  6  YES  7 
1  If I offer you at least 30% of my income we both make more than if you opt out.    7  YES  7 
8  How about 10? We will both make the same amount evenly.    10  YES  10 
10  I am a person of my word. I will transfer back $10 so we both make the same 
amount of money and more money than if you pick OUT 
  10  YES  10 
10  I will offer 10 dollars of my income to you. If you choose in, then you will 
recieve 10 dollars and i will recieve 10 dollars. If you choose out, you will only 
recieve 5 dollars. 
  10  YES  10 
20  I will split it with you so we both get ten dollars.    10  YES  10 
6      9  YES  9 
6  Please trust me when I say I will give you the amount I will promise you. This 
way,  we  will  both  earn  more  money  instead  of  you  just  earnint  $5  and  me 
earning nothing. Let's take all of their money together! 
  7  YES  7 
5  I will transfer 10 dollars.    10  YES  10 
5  Hey ¶  to make this a win-win situation for both of us ¶  I'll transfer $10 and that 
way both of us will earn the same amount. It's really a good gameplan. :) 
  0  YES  8 
7  Ok ¶  so this time let's make it actually fair.... I should have made it even last 
time. So this time if I give you back $8 ¶  you'll leave with $20 and I'll leave 
with $19. you still come out on top ¶  but I don't mind. And that's more than 
you'll make if you click OUT. I'm in the same boat as you....I too am poor as 
hell and would like to make some easy cash.... 
  8  YES  8 
20  I will transfer you back 75% back.    10  YES  0 
5  We can figure out a way to divide the amount of the $20 equally if the result 
from that will have us leave here with more than $7 
  10  YES  9 
10  I won't ask you to trust me.  That's your choice ¶  what I will say though is offer 
you $10 to each of us.  We both walk away from this evenly and both  better off 
than we came in. 
  10  YES  10 
4  I promise to transfer  back 20 of  my income to  you. I really  need this extra 
money. I hope you understand 
  20  YES  0 
9  Let's be fair and split the pool evenly. Trust that I will not go back on what I 
say. 
  10  YES  10 
6  I will give you half of the amount of the income    12  YES  0 
5  Hello  A ¶ I'm  stoked to  be  making  money  while  my roomate  snores away. 
Hahaha. ¶ Cha-ching ly ¶ B.¶ 
  4  YES  4  
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20  if i say $20 and you accpet ¶ I promise to give you $20 back so we both leave 
with $20 ¶  the max amount 
  20  YES  20 
8  I promise to uphold any deals set before me    10  YES  10 
6  I promise to give you $7 for clicking "in." I guarantee it. As I see it ¶  this gives 
you $2 more dollars than you would recieve by clicking "out." It's a win-win 
situation. 
  7  YES  7 
8      10  YES  0 
5  I think you should choose IN because it is simple game theory. If you choose IN 
and I choose to give you $10 ¶  which I promise to give you ¶  then we both 
win.  I know that you would automatically want to choose OUT so that you can 
get $5 no matter what ¶  but I promise you that you will get $10. We both want 
to get money ¶  and this is a good way to share our earnings. I hope you choose 
IN! :) 
  5  YES  0 
10  If I offered you 10$ why would you rather get 5?    10  YES  10 
6  Ouch. ): I'm not gonna  scam  you, dude. When I  make a promise, I  make a 
promise. We both make more money this way; it's good all around! 
  6  NO   
5  hey Participant a make a deal dont do like this we should come here to earn 
money kul 
  1  NO   
10  dont be an asshole    7  NO   
10  Trust me.    10  NO   
6  You'll get more than $5.    8  NO   
8  Hello there! So it's probably hard to trust me ¶  in that I will return your money? 
And I would quite frankly feel the same way. The thing is though that you don't 
know me but I know me and I know that when I make a promise I keep it. I 
hope you can trust in me. :) 
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6  14  I paid out more than I promised to transfer back the first time as a reward 
for going IN 
  10  YES  0 
6  6  merry christmas!    10  YES  10 
10  10  Same deal as before sounds about right, in my opinion.    10  YES  10 
8  8  i guess you need the money too so we should split it!    10  YES  10 
10  10  Hey there. Want to do the same thing again,  and both come out ahead?    10  YES  10 
9  9  hey so 10 and 10 this time?    10  YES  10 
10  10  I will split it equally    10  YES  10 
10  10  Thanks for accepting my last offer. I promise to always uphold my side 
of the deal. 
  10  YES  10 
9  9  hello A! :)    7  YES  7 
7  7  I won't lie to you. I know we're all broke college students here who need 
to make money. ugh 
  8  YES  8 
10  10  This is tres bizarre.    10  YES  10 
5  5  i send you 10 and you hit in..that way we both get the same amount of 
money. =] 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  Let's do the same thing,  that way we both get the max amount of money    10  YES  0 
10  10  we'll go 50/50 on everything. i promise.    10  YES  10 
6  6  we're a good pair. i dont know what else to say haha.    6  YES  1 
11  11  expecto patronum!    11  YES  2 
10  10  Pleasure doing business with you :)    10  YES  10 
9  9  :) I dont know what to say haha but ill split it 50 50 this time for you    10  YES  10 
10  10  Let's make some MONEY :) click in on all of them and i'll try and make 
it as fair as possible. 
  10  YES  10 
9  9  I hope you are satisfied with the amount of money I offered you.  I will 
offer more this time. 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  I don't really have anything to say...let's split the money 10-10 again    10  YES  10 
10  10  $10 is better than $5. Trust me, I'm a doctor haha    10  YES  10 
6  6      6  YES  6 
7  7  I will do exactly the same thing as I did before.    7  YES  7 
10  10  Lets split it 11/ 9 everytime, that way we both get more money IN than 
OUT? sound good? I don't think you can answer me. . . 
  9  YES  9 
6  6  Again I will promise $6. Please choose IN as it will maximize the profit 
that both of us can potentially made. I promise that I will send the full 
amount and if we can trust each other i will increase the amount I send in 
the following round. Thank you. 
  6  YES  6 
10  10  Same as last time? It's only fair we earn the same amount.    10  YES  10 
10  10  hi. i think it's best when we split it! makes it fair for everyone    10  YES  10 
10  10  ill give u ten everytime if you choose IN then we both get ten dollars 
everytime we both go home with the same amount of money. again ten 
dollars a piece everytime go home with same amt. :) 
  10  YES  10 
10  10      10  YES  10 
6  6  want to choose in and then we take half? 10 each?    10  YES  10 
8  8      8  YES  8 
10  10  Let's keep going 50/50    10  YES  10 
7  7  I promise to transfer you more money than last time.    9  YES  9 
9  9  Hi, hope you're content with the $9    10  YES  10 
10  10  Let's split the 20 evenly, 10-10    10  YES  10 
10  10  Want to just split it again?    10  YES  10 
10  10  same thing as before, we both might as well walk out with enough for 
gas money! 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  same thing?    10  YES  10 
             
9  9      9  YES  9 
10  10  I will keep it equal like last time.    10  YES  10 
8  10      7  YES  9 
9  9      9  YES  9 
8  8  Same as before Ill send you 8. We both get more $$ that way!    8  YES  0 
10  10  Same deal.    10  YES  10  
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10  10      10  YES  10 
8  8      8  YES  5 
10  10  i promise to do 50/50 again    10  YES  10 
8  8      8  YES  8 
8  8  hey, so i just want you to know that i'll probably sent you $8 or $9! nice 
working with you! 
  8  YES  8 
10  10  I like the way we did it last time, it works out nicely for both of us and 
it's fair :) ¶ Thanks for being great! 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  I will be fair.    10  YES  10 
6  6  Hi A! :)    9  YES  6 
8  8  I'm going to do the same thing.    8  YES  9 
9  9  I hope you're having a great day!    8  YES  8 
9  9  Teamwork!    10  YES  10 
10  10  I promise not to screw you out of any money and to transfer back what I 
say I will. If you choose in¶ we'll both benefit more! =D¶ 
  8  YES  8 
10  10  Don't  worry,  we'll  evenly split the money this time, too, just like last 
time.  I  won't  try  to  scam  you  or  anything,  because  that's  below  me. 
You'll get the 10 dollars that I promise you. :) 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  I'm not a risk taker and I'm not a dick. I said I'd give back ten before, and 
I did. We both want money. You can make $5 or $10 because I will give 
you ten again. yayyy money=)) 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  If we do this again, i'm always going to keep it equal for both of us.    10  YES  10 
10  10  Hi, so I know it's hard to trust someone who you don't even know but I'll 
be I'll do my best to make things work. 
  9  YES  9 
10  10  I figure we are both equally desperate for cash.    10  YES  10 
9  9  Hi Participant A ¶ I hope you trust me due to the previous round. I will 
take care  of you and uphold to  my  promises, if  you take care  of  me. 
Deal? Now lets do this and make some bank! ¶ ¶ Signed, ¶ Participant B 
  10  YES  10 
8  8  I'm going to offer $8 again. Hopefully you choose IN. That way we can 
both make a profit. 
  8  YES  8 
10  10  Have you ever done this before?    10  YES  10 
10  10      10  YES  10 
10  10  Same thing? Seems fair? ...    10  YES  10 
9  9  i promise i will give you what i say i will    10  YES  10 
10  10  Thanks,  glad  we're  both  making a good amount  of  money! It's tough 
starting us off though! Wish you the best! 
  10  YES  5 
10  10  Hello. Hope this  doesn't  sound  creepy  or anything. I  think  we  should 
work together to get out of here with the same amount of money. I'm 
going to send over 10 again. :) 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  I think each of us getting 10 dollars is fair. do you agree?    10  YES  10 
8  8  same as last time :)    8  YES  8 
9  9      9  YES  9 
10  10  You can trust me :)    10  YES  10 
10  10  Keep it even again    10  YES  10 
10  10  i chose to give $10 dollars and gave you $10 in that last part. i hope we 
get paid 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  I'm going to do the same thing as last time, 10 for you and 10 for me. We 
both would then walk away with 27 dollars :) 
  10  YES  10 
8  8      8  YES  8 
             
9  9      9  YES  9 
10  10  Hope you like the wind....    10  YES  10 
8  8  Were you happy with the outcome?    9  YES  9 
10  10  Hey if you accept the $10 then we both make that everytime and thats 
the most mutually beneficial. 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  Same thing again. We both benefit.    10  YES  10 
10  10  hi! let's split the money 50/50 and each get 10 every time    10  YES  10 
7  7      7  YES  7 
10  10  Thanks for choosing IN :) hopefully if we do the same thing again we'll 
both make $20 each? thanks! 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  Hello ¶  I wanted to make things 50/50. I don't really understand but that 
seemed fair to me at least 
  10  YES  10 
7  7  I have no idea what to say here. This is a nice text box?    8  YES  1 
9  9  I believe example 1 seemed the fairest for the position i was given. I did 
not want to be unfair however it seemed necessary to try and make a 
profit. I chose the smallest profit option which gave us both money in the 




10  10  I'll give you $10 just like before if you say "IN." ¶ It's a win-win (I get 
$10  instead  of  $0  and  you  get  $10  instead  of  $5  if  you  were  to  say 
"OUT." 
  10  YES  10 
7  7  I need a nap...    11  YES  10 
10  10  Let's just do that same transfer again    10  YES  10 
8  8  =]    9  YES  9 
10  10  Hi there ¶  just trying to keep things equal and honest ¶ now let's get 
some solid earnings again! :) 
  10  YES  10 
8  8  This is a haiku. ¶ I am glad you trusted me¶ This way we both win!    8  YES  10 
7  7      8  YES  8 
9  9  Please remember that if you say OUT ¶  you only get $5. I PROMISE 
you that I will not give you under that if you say IN ¶  I promise. 
  7  YES  6 
10  10  You're in good hands. Win/win.    10  YES  10 
10  10  I want to keep this fair and even!    10  YES  10 
10  10      10  YES  10 
9  9  I'm glad you trusted me and went with IN ¶  I'm gonna do the same thing 
again so hopefully you go with IN again :) 
  9  YES  9 
10  10  hi. i liked how we did it the first time. hopefully u did too    10  YES  0 
10  10  I will send you 10 if you select IN ¶    10  YES  10 
9  9  $6 is the minimum offer to accept...anything higher your making more $ 
just off genorosity 
  10  YES  6 
10  10      10  YES  10 
9  9  Good deal! I'll up the transfer a to make it a litte more fair    10  YES  0 
9  9  This time I'm going to promise 11 back to you ¶  and since you've seen I 
keep my promise ¶  when you click IN I will give you back 11 so we 
both walk out of here with 20. I don't break promises. 
  11  YES  11 
9  9  50/50 ¶  sound good?    10  YES  10 
10  10      10  YES  10 
8  8  I'll give you exactly what I promise    10  YES  10 
6  7      10  YES  8 
10  10  just wanted to say hello :) have a nice day!    10  YES  10 
10  10  Heyo- happy to work with you again ¶  and do the same thing.    10  YES  10 
10  10  Hi! I'm going to split the money evenly. Have a nice day!    10  YES  10 
9  9  Let's split it half and half ¶  ten dollars.    10  YES  10 
10  10  Hello "A". Based on our last experiment we have established trust ¶  so 
thanks for making that happen!  I will repeat the same steps as last time 
to ensure that we both get the same amount of money at our maximum 
level ¶  10$ each.it makes no sense to betray each other because we just 
come out of this thing with less money on both parts. Lets get rich!! 
  10  YES  1 
10  10  im going to offer you 10 again ¶  take it and we can profti equally    10  YES  0 
9  9  Hey just to let you know ¶  I try my best to never lie in life and I include 
this experiment part of my life standard so I won't lie. 
  6  YES  6 
10  10  Hey. same amount ¶  same money ¶  we both leave with 27 buck in our 
pocket. =] 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  Teamwork + Honesty = $$$$¶    8  YES  8 
7  7  I Hate Mondays¶                         -Garfield    17  YES  16 
10  10      10  YES  10 
8  8  Hey! So I want to make money ¶  just as much as you do ¶  so why dont 
we call it even and I promise $10 ¶  you accept ¶  and we get out of here! 
=D Thanks 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  Pay it forward. ¶ Have a great day.    10  YES  10 
7  7      7  YES  7 
10  10  Yay! great teamwork last time. I think we should do the same thing again 
this time. That way we both get the maximum amount of money. Hope 
that sounds good! :] 
  10  YES  10 
10  10  hi hope your doing well. i plan on doing the same thing as before    10  YES  10 
10  10  50-50 :]    10  YES  10 
10  10  Same thing?    10  YES  0 
10  10  I think we should do $10 each again ¶  works out best for the both of us.    10  YES  10 
9  9  Let's do the same...It worked and we both made some money!!!!    9  YES  9 
10  10  Hey beautiful. I hopee your having a good day. Truthfully ¶  I'll get you 
more money if you say IN. 
  10  YES  8 
9  9  well we worked together so far- want to do it again? at least we'll both 
make more than $5 
  7  YES  7 
10  10      10  YES  0  
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9  9  i will keep my promise!    9  YES  9 
10  10  trust me    20  YES  20 
7  7  I'm not quite sure what to say ¶  but hi!:)    10  YES  0 
9  9  lets do this!    10  YES  15 
9  9      10  YES  10 
9  9  same deal.    9  YES  9 
10  10      10  YES  8 
9  9      10  YES  10 
9  9  I'm not entirely sure what I'm supposed to say ¶  BUT point is I promise 
I will not jip you out of money. What I promise is what you'll get and I 
hope you will not jip me out of any money either :) 
  9  YES  9 
6  6      7  NO   
9  9      10  NO   
7  7  I'm planning on offering the same amount so we can potentially just do 
the same thing as before 
  7  NO   
8  8  choose IN ¶  i will transfer you the promised amount of $    9  NO   
8  8      7  NO   
10  10  we need eachother to make money.    20  NO   
8  8  Hi    7  NO   
7  7      7  NO   
9  9      8  NO   
8  8  We the People of the United States of America, ¶ Inorder to form a more 
perfect Union, ¶ Do ordain and establish this constitution of the United 
States... 
  8  NO   
10  10      5  NO   
6  6  I'll promise to transfer whatever amount I say    6  NO   
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